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Can we be coerced into lying?  Or does the very fact of coercion undercut the possibility of 
making an assertion?  Through discussion of capitulations and other forms of coerced speech, 
this chapter explores the ways in which apparent assertions may be drained of standard 
normative significance, and thus excluded from the category of lies.  Coerced pseudo-
assertions are in this way similar to coerced pseudo-promises, and to coerced pseudo-gifts, 
neither of which have the standard normative significance associated with genuine promises 
and gifts.  Nevertheless, our speech and actions under coercion are liable to moral evaluation, 
and coercion does not always make it permissible to speak falsely or attempt to mislead an 
audience. 
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Paradigmatic assertions are freely-chosen actions, and paradigmatic lies are freely-chosen 
perversions of this practice.  But we are often under external pressure to speak, or to remain 
silent, or to say something in particular.  Such pressure can range from slight social 
embarrassment to physical or mental torture, and from passing temptation to irresistible 
bribes. Some pressure is obviously coercive, whilst some is obviously not; the intermediate 
third category is large and confusing. 
 
There is a wealth of legal scholarship concerning compelled speech and its relationship to 
freedom of speech principles (e.g. Brudney 2000), the admissibility and reliability of 
confessions and testimony provided under duress (e.g. Perillo and Kassin 2011), and the ways 
in which duress, undue influence, or indeed deception can invalidate contracts or consents 
(e.g. Chen-Wishart 2015).  Moreover philosophers have written extensively about coerced 
action in general, attempting both to define coercion, and to understand its moral significance 
for both coercer and coercee: when and how does coercion excuse or justify behaviour which 
would otherwise be impermissible?  (Anderson 2015) 
 
But coerced speech, or speech elicited under duress, is rarely the main focus of attention in 
the philosophical literature.  One key exception is debate over whether apparent promises 
offered under coercion can be binding (e.g. Shiffrin 2014), and I will return to this topic 
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below.  Another is exciting new work by Rachel McKinney, in which she develops the notion 
of ‘extracted speech’, paying particular attention to what she calls ‘[u]njust extracted 
speech…[i.e.] speech that an agent is made to produce that also wrongs her’ (2016: 259).  
McKinney focuses on power structures and subordination; my approach and focus are 
somewhat different to McKinney’s, but I believe our discussions are usefully complementary.   
 
In this paper I address a range of possible situations in which it seems that someone is 
coerced into telling a lie – or, at least, coerced into doing something which would have 
counted as lying had it not been coerced.  It is clear that people can be coerced into saying 
things which they know to be false, and indeed coerced into attempting to deceive others, 
sometimes successfully.  But can coerced utterances of this kind count as lies, or does 
coercion somehow nullify this possibility, just as coercion may sometimes invalidate what 
would otherwise have been a binding promise?  I will also discuss the extent to which we can 
morally evaluate such coerced utterances even if they do not qualify as lies: coercion is 
widely thought to mitigate responsibility somehow, and this has consequences for coerced 
speech just as it has for coerced action.   
 
Section 1: Capitulations 
To motivate these discussions, I begin with an exchange between Tim Kenyon (2003, 2010) 
and Roy Sorensen (2007).  Kenyon and Sorensen focus primarily on uncoerced yet obviously 
insincere utterances, where the speaker does not intend to deceive the audience – so-called 
‘bald-faced lies’.  They agree that such utterances can be assertions, but disagree about 
whether they qualify as lies (see also Maitra, this volume). 
 
But they also discuss coerced utterances, and the ‘capitulations’ which sometimes occur 
when someone is under severe pressure to produce a specific utterance.  For example, a 
victim may be tortured or threatened into renouncing religious or ideological convictions, or 
into confessing to some crime which she may or may not have committed.  Both Kenyon and 
Sorensen cite Dummett’s example of a Christian subject to religious persecution, who is 
forced to trample on a crucifix; such episodes of persecution are central to Shūsako Endō’s 





…in the same spirit, what [the Christian] is forced to do may be to say, e.g., “Jesus 
Christ is the offspring of the devil”…The victim may know that his persecutors will 
be quite aware that, even if he says what they want him to, he will not believe it: what 
is important to both of them is whether he says it or not.  (Dummett 1981: 331, italics 
in original).  
 
The persecuted man does not intend that his audience believe that his speech is an expression 
of his belief; in that sense, the utterance is patently insincere, as in a bald-faced lie.  But for 
Kenyon, ‘To deny one’s faith under torture is not to assert’ (2003: 245); Leland (2015) makes 
a similar point.  Sorensen (2007) disagrees, on several grounds.  First, he argues that it is 
difficult to understand why victims are so desperate to avoid voicing capitulations if these are 
not really assertions.  Second, he cites Gilbert (1993) in support of the claim that a coerced 
promise can create an obligation.  Third, he argues that much speech is subject to some 
degree of duress, but is nevertheless described as ‘assertion’.  Sorensen’s view seems to be 
that a coerced capitulation can be a (forgivable) lie. 
 
In response, Kenyon (2010) compares capitulation to theatrical speech, which is 
uncontroversially non-assertoric.  Kenyon argues that an audience which knows that a 
capitulation has been forced should not hold the speaker to any supposed ‘commitments’ of 
defence-or-retraction, and is not licensed to act on the basis of what is said.  He explains the 
horror of capitulation not in terms of forced assertion, as Sorensen does, but in terms of 
‘pride, dignity, and value for self-determination’ (2010: 364).   
 
Religious cases have special complications, with implications of blasphemy and a divine 
audience.  A different context of capitulation is the totalitarian state, in which people are 
perpetually uncertain of who is listening, and where their loyalties lie, with even family 
members under suspicion.  Sorensen discusses Iraq under Saddam Hussein: ordinary people 
must constantly praise the dictator, to one another and to foreign visitors.  For Sorensen, these 
utterances are assertions (and lies) despite everyone’s mutual awareness of the pragmatic 
reasons for speaking this way, and their lack of intention to deceive one another.  These 
things must simply be said, for fear of the consequences otherwise. 
 
Jennifer Saul, in discussing such cases, writes: 
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It seems somewhat reasonable to suggest that, since everyone is forced to make these 
false utterances, and everyone knows they are false, they cease to be genuine lies.  
The reason for this might even be that they cease to have their apparent content [as 
idioms do]…Perhaps they are even treated as meaningless.  I think this story is 
possible, but that something is lost by adopting it wholesale.  What is lost is a 
recognition of the fact that one of the terrible things done by a totalitarian state is to 
force people to lie with these state-supporting utterances…On the other hand, treating 
the utterances as meaningless might be an important source of resistance.  (2012: 9-
10)   
 
These cases are incidental to Saul’s main discussion.  But it is striking that she focuses on 
content rather than force – either such capitulations are lies or else they lack (literal) content – 
thus omitting the possibility that such utterances are like theatrical performances, which have 
meaning but lack assertoric force.  (Saul writes of warranting rather than assertion, but this 
serves to distinguish serious from non-serious contexts much as talk of assertion does.)  
Kenyon might respond that one awful aspect of living under such a regime is the constant 
need to perform as if appearing in a drearily predictable play. 
 
Capitulations of the types discussed in this literature differ from ordinary assertions, even 
from ordinary lying assertions, in at least two ways.  First, they embody a bald-faced lack of 
sincerity.  The audience is aware that the speaker’s immediate motive in saying that p is not 
to express a belief that p, or to persuade others that p, but simply to satisfy the tormenter’s 
demands that she say that p.  Indeed, the speaker is aware that the audience is aware of this, 
and so on, so there is no intent to deceive.  It is this lack of sincerity which most concerns 
Kenyon, Sorensen, and Saul.   
 
Second, the speaker is subject to coercion: this may affect the normative status of the speaker, 
the normative status of her speech, or indeed the normative status of the coercer.  What about 
the audience?  In some cases, coercer and audience are identified: we easily imagine 
Dummett’s religious persecution case in this way.  In other cases, the audience includes 
morally innocent third parties, perhaps including fellow victims of coercion: this is the story 
of everyday life in the totalitarian state.  Morally innocent audiences can be further divided, 
into audiences who are aware that the speaker is coerced (e.g. fellow subjects of the 
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totalitarian state) and audiences who are not aware that the speaker is coerced (e.g. naïve 
visitors to the totalitarian state).  
 
These two features – obvious lack of sincerity, and coercion – can come apart.  We have the 
first feature without the second in standard cases of uncoerced bald-faced ‘lies’, e.g. the 
student who denies plagiarism for procedural reasons, although it is obvious to everyone 
concerned that she is guilty (Carson 2006).  And we have the second feature without the first 
in several different types of situation.  For example, a speaker may be coerced into saying 
that p to some audience, and moreover coerced into appearing sincere whilst she does so.  
Alternatively, a speaker may be coerced with the aim of getting her to reveal what she 
believes about whether p, i.e. to say whichever of p or not-p she believes, rather than coerced 
to say that p as such.  Here, even if the audience consists of the coercers themselves, the 
speaker may appear sincere in saying whether p, and may in fact be genuinely sincere.  In 
what follows, I will consider cases of coerced speech both with and without apparent 
sincerity. 
 
Typically we think of coercion as making us do things we would not have done if uncoerced.  
But what if someone is coerced to say that p, even though she would have said that p even 
without coercion?  For example, imagine that the totalitarian state requires everyone to say 
how beautiful the native landscape is, and yet many subjects genuinely believe that the 
landscape is beautiful, and would spontaneously say this without coercion.  This is a point at 
which different accounts of coercion, and different accounts of responsibility and freedom, 
may issue different verdicts; we need carefully to distinguish counterfactuals from both 
causal and reason-giving claims in order to understand the relationship between coercion and 
action in such cases.  To avoid such complications, I will focus on situations in which 
coercion is directly responsible for our saying and doing things we would not have said and 
done otherwise.  
 
I am making distinctions between types of case, and I will make further distinctions below.  
Distinction-drawing is an ingrained philosophical habit, and for good reason: it is often a 
useful first step in attempting to understand complex issues.  But I acknowledge that many 
real life cases will not easily be classifiable in terms of these distinctions.  For example, the 
boundary between coercive interrogation (coercion to say sincerely whether p or not-p) and 
coerced capitulation (coercion to say that p) is often blurry.  An interrogator may think he 
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already knows that the target believes that p, rather than not-p – for example the interrogator 
may attempt to coerce what he takes to be a sincere confession of a crime.   (In this context, 
Kenyon (2010) references Henry Shue’s (1978) distinction between interrogational and 
terroristic torture.) 
 
Moreover, there are related but different distinctions I might have drawn.  For example, 
rather than distinguishing coercion to say sincerely whether p from coercion to say that p, I 
might have distinguished information-seeking from non-information-seeking coercion of 
speech.  That is, I might have taxonomised cases in terms of what the coercer hopes to gain 
from the coercion, rather than in terms of what the coercee is expected to do as a result of the 
coercion.  This would be important in a different paper, one more focused on the 
epistemology of coerced testimony than on the ethics of speaking under coercion.  What I 
offer in this paper is thus not intended to be a full or final taxonomy of coerced speech: 
different categories will be useful for different local purposes, as for example McKinney’s 
(2016) framework works well for the questions she pursues. 
 
Terrorised capitulations and coerced confessions are evidently atypical assertions and lies, if 
they are assertions and lies at all.  As such, it makes sense to allow our more general accounts 
of assertion and lying to help determine how best to classify such cases, rather than relying 
solely upon these cases as crucial experiments which can fix which account of assertion or 
lying we should adopt.  Nevertheless, thinking about coerced speech may help us better 
understand the ways in which we more standardly hold people responsible for what they say, 
including the lies they tell.  After all, coercion is commonly thought to eliminate or at least 
mitigate the victim’s responsibility for her actions. 
 
Section 2.  Coercion and Responsibility 
How might coercion affect the moral or other normative status of speech, especially 
knowingly-false speech?  Unfortunately, there is no philosophical consensus about what 
constitutes coercion, nor how coercion affects the victim’s responsibility for what she is 
coerced to do (Anderson 2015 provides an overview of debate).  Can there be coercive offers 
as well as coercive threats?  What is the difference between a threat, an offer (-you-can’t-
refuse), and even a warning?  How threatening must a threat be in order to be coercive?  Does 
coercion always wrong its target?   I will not attempt to delineate borderline cases, nor to 
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define coercion.  Rather, I will focus on cases in which it is clear that coercion takes place, in 
order to examine the consequences of such coercion. 
 
One thing which does seem relatively uncontroversial is that we should distinguish between 
coercion which completely overwhelms the target’s will, making her incapable of choosing 
how to act in the relevant matter, and coercion which changes the relative appeal of the 
options between which the target is choosing.  This distinction applies both to speech and to 
non-speech forms of action. 
 
Physical imprisonment coerces a target in the first way, rendering her unable to choose 
whether to leave the room or not.  Threatening to kill the target’s children if she leaves the 
room would typically coerce in the second way: leaving the room becomes highly 
unappealing to the target, but she is still in some sense able to choose whether to do so.  
Although physical imprisonment or force is the paradigm case of overwhelming coercion, the 
important distinction here is not between two types of coercive action, but between two ways 
in which coercion can affect its target.  After all, the very same type of threat might coerce 
different people in different ways: some people might become physiologically paralysed 
upon hearing the threat to their children’s lives, rendered unable to choose whether to leave 
the room. 
 
How does this distinction apply to speech?  A literal gag constitutes overwhelming coercion 
to literal silence.  If we think more broadly of speech as including the ability to reach an 
audience, then overwhelming coercion to ‘silence’ could include solitary confinement, 
internet access restrictions, or confiscation of broadcasting equipment.  There are obvious 
connections here to debate about what is protected by any right to free speech, and to debate 
about pornography and silencing (e.g. Maitra and McGowan 2012). 
 
Can one be literally forced to speak, rather than remain silent?  Can one be literally forced to 
say something in particular?  Maybe hypnosis sometimes functions like this, or torture which 
entirely overwhelms the will, perhaps through mental dislocation and disorientation; forced 
speech might also result from an effective ‘truth serum’ if such a thing existed.  
Overwhelming coercion is easier to implement for some types of communication than for 
others: imagine a hand physically forced to write, or a BSL/ASL signer with limbs literally 
strung like a puppet.  We can distinguish overwhelming coercion to say that p, reducing us to 
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the level of a ventriloquist’s dummy, from overwhelming coercion to expose one’s belief as 
to whether p, making us readable as by a fantasy MRI scan which was sensitive to semantic 
content. 
 
I will take it that someone who speaks as the result of such overwhelming coercion is not 
making an assertion, or warranting.  This is because such episodes of speech are not 
intentional actions on the part of the speaker; likewise, sleep-talk doesn’t count as assertion.  
This point does not rely upon any distinctive feature of speech as opposed to other behaviour: 
similarly, someone hypnotised into firing a gun is not performing an intentional action, and 
nor is someone physically forced to pull the trigger.  Even without considering coercion, 
there are tricky borderline cases of assertion, including cases in which, perhaps because of 
linguistic misapprehension, someone might be intentionally asserting, yet unintentionally 
asserting that p (Alston 2000: section 5.8), or cases in which an utterance is a borderline 
assertion, perhaps because the speaker is half-asleep, or because she is wavering between 
asserting and merely suggesting.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that speech, writing, or signing 
which is extracted through overwhelming coercion cannot constitute assertion. 
 
There is a sense in which forced speech of this kind involves telling an audience something.  
But this is the ‘natural meaning’ sense of telling (Grice 1957), i.e. the sense in which the car 
in my driveway tells the neighbours that I am home, or the bags under my eyes tell my 
friends that I am not sleeping well.  What someone says when overwhelmingly coerced may 
in this sense tell the audience something about what she believes, or indeed about how easy 
or difficult it is to overwhelm her will.  But the speaker herself is not telling the audience that 
p even when she says that p under such circumstances, any more than she would tell an 
audience that p if someone forced her hand to write ‘p’ (mysteriously!) on the page.   
 
I will return to telling, asserting and warranting below when I consider non-overwhelming 
forms of coercion.  Perhaps some readers will feel that I have built too much into these 
notions if I have rendered them unavailable to sleep-talkers or to overwhelmingly coerced 
speakers.  However even if, as I deny, standard sleep-talk or forced utterances can be genuine 
assertions, there is certainly no interesting sense in which they can be lies: someone who 
accuses me of lying is fully refuted if I can show that I was asleep at the time the speech 




There are indirect ways of holding people responsible for what occurs in sleep, or following 
overwhelming coercion: we might hold someone responsible for having a will which was too 
easily overwhelmed, or for allowing herself to be captured, or hypnotised, or drugged, in the 
first place.  Likewise, we might hold someone responsible for having dozed off in public 
when she knows she is prone to compromising sleep-talk (imagine a politician on the 
campaign trail).  Nevertheless, this doesn’t seem like the kind of direct responsibility for 
speaking falsely which is a precondition of lying: again, if you accuse me of lying, and I can 
show you that I was asleep when I was speaking, I need no further excuse or justification in 
this respect, even if I need to apologise for allowing myself to fall asleep in the first place.     
 
Because it is so obvious in these cases that the speaker is not lying, they are not especially 
interesting for the purposes of this paper.  So I now set aside coercion which overwhelms the 
target’s will, to focus instead on the second kind of coercion.  This is coercion which changes 
the relative appeal of the target’s options whilst leaving her able to choose between them, 
whether resentfully or resignedly.  Such coercion underpins people’s everyday false speech in 
totalitarian regimes, and it seems to be what Dummett has in mind when writing of 
capitulations.  Moreover, such coerced speech is philosophically interesting for the ways in 
which it allows us to draw apart different aspects of speakers’ responsibility for what is said.  
The very fact that such coercion is not completely overwhelming indicates that there is some 
sense in which the speaker is responsible for her choice to speak in that way, but it is also 
very natural to think that coercion diminishes responsibility in some respect, and/or changes 
our moral evaluation of the speech in question. 
 
Section 3. Coercion and Normative Practices 
Coercion can sometimes excuse behaviour, or justify actions which would otherwise be 
unjustified.  If I trample your flower bed because I am physically pushed onto it, the push 
means that I had no other option – overwhelming coercion provides me with an excuse.  But 
if I trample the flowers because I am ordered at gunpoint to do so, then the threat is 
standardly not thought of as an excuse for my behaviour, but rather as a justification for my 
choosing to act in that way.  Trampling your flowers was the right thing to do, given the 
circumstances, i.e. the potentially fatal consequences of not trampling.  
 
Such coercion is not, however, a ‘get out of jail free’ card.  Whether or not it is justifiable to 
conform to a coercive threat, for example, depends in part on factors such as how severe the 
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threat is, and what action is being coerced.  I am justified in trampling on your flowers if I am 
threatened with death otherwise.  However it is less clear whether I am justified in trampling 
on your flowers if my aggressor is merely threatening to trash my garden if I don’t trash 
yours.  Even a very serious threat, for example a threat to my own life, might not justify me 
in committing some horrendous act against others.  There is no straightforward moral 
calculus here, and the justifying power of coercion needs to be assessed case by case.  
 
In addition to these issues around excuse and justification, distinctive issues arise where non-
overwhelming coercion is brought to bear upon normative practices.  The normative practice 
of assertion is of course at the heart of the present paper.  But I will approach it by first 
exploring two other normative practices: gift-giving and promise-making.  I will argue, as 
others have done, that such practices can be undermined by non-overwhelming coercion.  My 
main goal is merely to establish that coercion does sometimes have this undermining power, 
and I do not offer any detailed account of how, why and when this occurs.  Nevertheless, I 
am guided by the accounts of Owens (2012: ch.10) and Pallikkathayil (2011); I will return to 
each of these authors in course of my discussion. 
 
Imagine that I hand over some of my money to someone who will use it to harm themselves 
or others.  You object to what I have done, and I tell you that I handed over the money only 
because the person in question threatened me into doing so.  The threat means that I did not 
transfer property rights in handing over the money: if I get the opportunity to take back the 
money, then I can do so without automatically thereby wronging its ‘possessor’, whereas 
genuine gifts cannot be unilaterally retrieved without doing at least prima facie wrong to the 
recipient of the gift.  (Sometimes retrieving a genuine gift is all things considered the right 
thing to do, just as sometimes stealing is all things considered the right thing to do, but 
nevertheless apologies and compensation are appropriate.)   
 
A genuine gift is not subject to coercion.  Thus, if you were objecting to my making a gift of 
this money, then by citing the threat I show you that I did not make a gift.  Relatedly, if you 
object to my taking back the money when I get the opportunity, then by citing the initial 
threat I show you that I am not stealing but recovering what was in effect taken from me.  
(What if I am coerced into handing money to an innocent third party?  I return to this issue 
below.) 
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We see a similar structure when considering the act of promise-making under duress.  Under 
normal circumstances, an uncoerced promise generates new obligations: the promiser is now 
obliged to keep the promise.  This is not to say that breaking a promise can never be justified: 
sometimes exigent circumstances can make this the right thing to do.  Nevertheless, a broken 
promise wrongs the promisee.  In such exigent circumstances, as David Owens writes, 
‘…guilt, remorse, apology, requests for forgiveness are appropriate responses on the part of 
the promisor even though what they have done [i.e. broken the promise] was justified.’ 
(2012: 233). 
 
But it is very widely accepted that a (seeming) promise extracted under coercion typically 
fails to generate such promissory obligations.  There are many different views about why 
coercion has this invalidating power, and indeed about whether coercion always invalidates 
promise-making, or only typically does so.  For example, Owens argues that coercion 
invalidates promising only if the promisor was wronged by the coercion; he claims that 
people are not inevitably wronged by coercion, as when parents permissibly coerce their 
children into better behaviour.  John Deigh (2002) argues that during war coerced promises 
may be binding: under the right circumstances, a coerced surrender may involve a valid 
promise not to resume fighting.  And Seana Shiffrin (2014) distinguishes ‘scripted’ from 
‘initiated’ coerced promises.  If the target is directly coerced into making a specific, scripted 
‘promise’, this does not bind her.  But if a coerced target initiates a promise, e.g. as a 
negotiating move, this can be binding.  Both Deigh and Shiffrin stress the importance for all 
parties of keeping channels of communication and commitment open even under hostile 
circumstances. 
 
(A note on terminology: some authors write as if valid and invalid promises were both 
promises.  In contrast, I will use scare quotes to indicate invalid ‘promises’, and likewise for 
coerced ‘gifts’.  Nothing of substance is intended to hang on this decision, which will recur 
below in my discussion of coerced ‘assertions’ and ‘lies’.) 
 
For my purposes it is enough to note the consensus over the point that coercion can very 
often invalidate a ‘promise’, despite the lack of consensus about the limits and explanation of 
this phenomenon.  If you object to my making a certain ‘promise’, then, in central cases, by 
citing a threat I show you that I did not genuinely promise.  And if you object to my not 
keeping my ‘promise’, then again in central cases I can defend myself by reference to the 
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threat, which shows that I am not bound by promissory obligations.   (What if I am coerced 
into making a ‘promise’ to an innocent third party?  I return to this issue below.) 
 
Thus coercion can nullify standard normative moves regarding both gift-giving and promise-
making.  The same is true, notoriously, with coerced ‘consent’. Japa Pallikkathayil (2011) 
frames this in terms of ‘impaired normative authority’: victims of coercion suffer a reduced 
ability to make discretionary changes in permissions and obligations.  She argues that this 
captures both the way in which coercion wrongs its victim, and the way in which coercion 
mitigates the victim’s responsibility for her actions, but without implausibly picturing 
coerced actions as unchosen, or as nonactions.  David Owens (2012: 241-2) argues that the 
validity of a ‘promise’ depends on whether the speaker’s being able to generate promissory 
obligations serves her specifically normative interests on that occasion: ‘promises’ extracted 
under wrongful coercion do not satisfy this condition.  Whilst the differences between these 
accounts (and indeed others) are significant for many purposes, I will not pursue them here: 
my main point is just to establish that coercion sometimes nullifies ordinary normative 
moves. 
 
Section 4. But was it Justified? 
Even where coercion clearly blocks a normative move in this way, questions of justification 
may remain.  For example, coercion which invalidates a ‘gift’ may not suffice to justify the 
corresponding act of transfer, given the consequences of handing over the money, and the 
consequences of refusing to do so.   
 
Imagine that my neighbour threatens to daub graffiti on my front door if I do not provide 
money to pay for a hit on her ex-husband. I hand over the money, but the threat means that 
this is not a gift, and so I am not liable to any criticism of my gift-giving practices.  
Nevertheless, I am not justified in handing over the money: I have valued my paintwork over 
a man’s life.  In some ways, what I have done is like leaving a pile of cash just inside an open 
window, knowing that my unscrupulous neighbour is desperate to pay for the hitman.  My 
neighbour does not acquire property rights if she reaches in to steal the money; nevertheless I 





Imagine instead that my neighbour credibly threatens to injure my children if I do not provide 
enough money to buy hideous ornaments for her front garden, thus lowering the tone of the 
whole street; I hastily hand over the money.  Again, this isn’t gift-giving.  But in this case, the 
seriousness of the threat and the relative triviality of the tone-lowering justify my action.  I 
have acted reasonably in valuing my children’s safety over neighbourhood aesthetics. 
 
So coercion can prevent a transfer of money or goods from constituting a genuine gift.  But it 
does not always justify the transfer itself, i.e. the act which would have constituted gift-giving 
had it been uncoerced.  Whether the transfer itself is justified depends on factors such as the 
severity and credibility of the threat, the possible consequences of transferring or not 
transferring, and the rights and interests of various parties. 
 
The same applies to coerced ‘promises’.  Suppose my colleague threatens to bad-mouth me to 
the Dean if I do not promise to mark all the exams for his class, and so I say ‘I promise to 
mark those exams’.  My partner is cross when he hears about this, knowing that if I mark the 
exams our weekend will be ruined.  I tell my partner that my ‘promise’ was extracted via a 
coercive threat.  Now, by most accounts, my partner should appreciate that I have not made a 
valid promise to my colleague, and that I would not wrong the colleague if I failed to mark 
the exams.  But even accepting that I did not make a valid promise, there is a further question 
as to whether I was justified in saying ‘I promise to mark those exams’.   
 
In saying ‘I promise’ I may have generated other, non-promissory reasons for me to mark the 
exams and thus ruin our weekend.  The colleague will now not do his own marking, so the 
students will fail to graduate if I don’t step in; others who heard the ‘promise’ but not the 
threat will now wrongly but damagingly regard me as a promise-breaker if I fail to do the 
marking.  By saying ‘I promise’, although I have not promised, I have helped bring about a 
situation in which I have most reason to do the marking and thus ruin our weekend; my 
partner may argue that I should have chosen the bad-mouthing rather than the ruined 
weekend.  In addition, perhaps there were reasons not to say ‘I promise’ which do not turn on 
the badness of my doing the marking: perhaps I should have stood up to my colleague’s 




So a coerced ‘gift’ does not directly result in a transfer of property rights with their 
concomitant permissions and obligations, and a coerced ‘promise’ does not generate the 
standard obligations to act as ‘promised’.  But, as Pallikkathayil writes,  
[where a mugger threatens a victim into ‘promising’] the victim’s utterance is still 
morally assessable even though she makes it in order to save her life. If she has an 
obligation to someone other than the mugger not to engage in deceptive acts, she may 
have an obligation to follow through with her apparent promise in order to avoid 
wronging these others. The impaired normative authority account is only committed 
to claiming that the promise itself is not binding. (2011: 17)   
 
In the cases I have considered so far, coercion restricts the victim’s normative authority, as 
Pallikkathayil would put it, with respect to the victim herself and/or the coercer.  That is, the 
neighbour threatens me into transferring money to her, rather than to some innocent third 
party, and the colleague threatens me into saying ‘I promise to mark the exams’ to him, rather 
than to the students.  But it should be uncontroversial that third party interests may be 
relevant to whether the coerced person was justified in transferring the money, or in saying ‘I 
promise’, even where coercion means that there was no genuine gift or promise.  My 
neighbour’s ex-husband’s interests are relevant to whether I should have handed over the 
money that the neighbour will spend on a hitman.  And my partner’s interests are relevant to 
whether I should have said ‘I promise to mark those exams’.  Moreover, as Pallikkathayil 
suggests, once the initial transfer or utterance has taken place, third party interests may be 
relevant to whether the coercee should act as if a genuine gift or promise has been made, even 
though in fact this is not the case.   
Some might be tempted to think that, in addition, under certain circumstances coerced ‘gifts’ 
to innocent third parties can constitute genuine gifts and coerced ‘promises’ to innocent third 
parties can constitute valid promises.  Fully investigating this issue would require me to adopt 
some more specific view of how coercion nullifies normative moves.  But prima facie it 
would be dangerous for us to allow such coerced moves to have the normative status of 
uncoerced moves; in particular, it would seem wrong for others to enforce the obligations and 
permissions supposedly created by coercion in this way.  Of course, one feels a pull of 
sympathy to the innocent third parties who are unaware that the ‘gift’ or ‘promise’ they have 
received is not the genuine article.  But we can account for this, and for the reasons created 
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by such innocent third-party expectations, without regarding such reasons as corresponding to 
property rights or promissory obligations. (Chwang 2011: 162-3).   
 
Section 5. Assertion, Lies, and Normative Authority 
How might the idea of impaired normative authority help us understand coerced ‘assertions’?  
Like promising, gift-giving, and consenting, ordinary assertion is a normative business.  This 
is clear for views which associate assertion with commitment either to defend what is said or 
else retract it in the light of criticism (Brandom 1983).  On such a picture, to make an 
assertion is to undertake a commitment, imposing new obligations upon oneself, and creating 
new permissions for the audience.  This kind of view is at issue between Dummett, Kenyon, 
and Sorensen.     
 
Moreover those who work primarily with the notion of telling, rather than assertion, also 
emphasise normative relationships between speaker and audience (Hornsby 1994, Fricker 
2006).  For example, Hinchman (2005) argues that telling involves an invitation to trust, i.e. 
the creation of a permission to trust, and, plausibly, an obligation upon oneself to be 
trustworthy in the relevant respect.  Similarly, Moran (2005) understands testimony in terms 
of the offering of assurance, a taking of responsibility for what others may believe.  
Intriguingly, Moran makes a connection between assertion and freedom of choice: 
Further, a specific assumption of responsibilities is essentially an expression of a 
person’s freedom, something that only makes sense as consciously assumed. It is for 
this reason that words spoken during sleep or under hypnosis do not have the value of 
testimony, because they do not count as assertions, whatever expressive psychological 
value they might still retain as evidence. Like a promise or an apology, something 
only counts as a person’s assertion when consciously presented as such by him.  
(2005: 18) 
 
But one can recognise normative aspects of assertion without adopting either an assurance 
picture or a Brandom-style ‘commitment account’.  It is very widely thought that asserting 
involves taking responsibility, making oneself accountable, or undertaking something: this is 
typically taken as a starting point, before different authors diverge in their analyses of quite 
how this works.   For Peirce, ‘to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its 
truth’ (1932: 384).  For Searle an assertion of p ‘counts as an undertaking to the effect that p 
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represents an actual state of affairs’ (1969: 66).  For Alston, an assertion that p involves a 
speaker’s taking responsibility for its being the case that p (2000: 120); more generally, 
Alston understands a whole range of ‘illocutionary acts’ in terms of the speaker’s taking 
responsibility for the satisfaction of relevant conditions.  Even for Williamson, ‘[t]o make an 
assertion is to confer a responsibility (on oneself) for the truth of its content’ (2000: 268), a 
responsibility discharged by knowing the truth of that content, and thus satisfying what 
Williamson identifies as the epistemic norm governing assertion. 
 
This standard connection between asserting and taking responsibility may partially explain 
what is so disorienting about some of Donald Trump’s practices of speech and tweeting (I 
write in the run-up to the 2017 inauguration).  He speaks in contexts which are appropriate 
for assertion (e.g. not in theatrical contexts), with the mannerisms and tone of someone who 
is asserting, yet sometimes seems oblivious to any sense that such speech incurs 
commitments.  In line with my arguments so far, one might wonder whether this is really a 
practice of assertion at all.  To begin to explore this, we would need to consider questions 
about the relative rôles of speaker intentions and audience expectations in determining the 
significance of a speech practice (Kukla 2014).  It is important to acknowledge that speech 
can be morally evaluable in connection with its truth value even if it does not constitute 
assertion: even in more ordinary situations, acts of hinting, speculating, questioning, and so 
on are all morally evaluable. 
 
I have invoked a tangle of multifarious norms; different accounts of assertion, telling, and 
even testimony will articulate the normative aspects in different ways.  But however this is 
spelt out, we should expect to find respects in which, under ordinary non-coercive 
circumstances, a person who tells someone that p exercises her normative authority, in 
Pallikkathayil’s sense, in a way which can be curtailed by coercion.  An uncoerced teller 
creates obligations upon herself – perhaps to speak knowledgeably, or at least to avoid 
deliberate falsehood – and creates permissions for her audience, perhaps to believe that p on 
this basis, or to hold the speaker responsible in some sense for the truth of p.   
 
We saw earlier that coercion can restrict the normative authority of its target.  Just as coerced 
‘gifts’ do not transfer property rights, and coerced ‘promises’ do not generate promissory 
obligations, coerced ‘assertions’ do not generate the standard normative shifts associated with 
uncoerced assertions.  So for example, one cannot be coerced into taking responsibility for 
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the truth of p, in the relevant sense of making oneself liable to criticism if p is false at the 
moment of speaking.   
 
It is true that people can be coerced into doing things which result in their becoming obliged 
to make it the case that p, for some p.   For example, when I am coerced into saying ‘I 
promise to mark the exams’, making the students dependent upon me for their graduation, 
then perhaps I become obliged to mark the exams, even though I did not genuinely promise 
to do so.  Then in a sense I have been coerced into taking responsibility for the truth of a 
proposition, the proposition that the exams will be marked.  But this responsibility-for-
making-true is the not the type of responsibility undertaken in (uncoerced) assertion 
according to Peirce, Searle, Alston or Williamson.  Rather, in asserting, one makes oneself 
somehow answerable for p’s being true as you assert it.  It is this making oneself answerable 
that is undermined by coercion, just as the normative shifts associated with ordinary 
promising and gifting are undermined by coercion. 
 
Are coerced ‘assertions’ really assertions at all?  My claim is that they do not have the 
normative significance of uncoerced assertions, and in line with my earlier practice I will use 
scare-quotes: they are mere ‘assertions’.  An alternative practice would be to refer to such 
coerced utterances as invalid or nullified assertions, but nothing of substance hangs on this.  
Likewise, a fortiori, coerced ‘assertions’ are not genuine lies.  We could call them invalid or 
nullified lies, but again, nothing of substance hangs on this. 
 
Section 6: Justification 
Coerced ‘lies’ are not genuine lies.  But the coerced speaker is not automatically justified in 
making insincere utterances.  As with ‘gifts’ and ‘promises’, we can evaluate a speaker’s 
decision to make an ‘assertion’ under coercion: non-overwhelming coercion does not 
automatically justify every action.  I will consider a few cases to illustrate how such 
evaluations might proceed.  But we should bear in mind the wide variety of possible 
situations in which speech may be coerced.  For example, it may make a difference whether 
the audience and the coercer are one and the same, what the audience knows about whether 
the speech is coerced, and whether the speaker is coerced to say that p, or else to say 
sincerely whether p.  Other relevant factors include the degree of coercion applied, and the 
consequences of complying or not complying.  As I noted earlier in this paper, there are many 
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cross-cutting ways of taxonomising cases of coerced speech, and not every distinction is a 
sharply determinate one. 
 
Let’s begin with capitulation-style coercion to say that p, to an audience which perpetrates 
and thus knows about the coercion: the case of Dummett’s persecuted Christian, for example.  
Given the coercion, such an utterance is not an assertion, and a fortiori not a lie.  
Nevertheless, we can weigh up the reasons to make this utterance against the reasons not to 
make it, and try to make a judgement about whether the coercee’s decision to say that p was 
justified.  Although of course this calculation will vary enormously with the details of the 
case, it is striking that the truth of p, and whether the speaker believes that p, do not look like 
especially weighty factors in the balance, given that the audience knows of the coercion.  It is 
not obvious that there is always some reason to prefer sincere utterances in such cases: much 
depends upon whether sincerity has better or worse psychological or practical consequences 
for the speaker.  Some people might strongly resist insincerity – perhaps especially in 
religious contexts – but others might feel that it is more dignified not to express their genuine 
beliefs in such circumstances. 
 
What about everyday life in the totalitarian state, in which the audience knows of the 
coercion, so there is no attempt at mutual deception, but the audience is not responsible for 
the coercion?  Again, I argue that the coercion means that the relevant utterances are not 
genuine assertions, but nevertheless there are questions to be asked about whether speaking 
this way is justifiable or not.  For example, we might weigh up the severity of the threat, the 
likelihood that any rebellion would spread and succeed, whether there are other priorities for 
resistance, and so on.  The fact that the audience for such assertions is not misled into 
thinking them sincere, and moreover does not suffer the insult or disrespect inflicted by a 
genuine lie, presumably weighs in favour of such utterances being justified.  But it is an 
empirical question whether even patently insincere utterances can cumulatively give 
legitimacy to what is said, contributing to an ethically-significant process of normalisation.   
 
What difference does it make if such known-to-the-audience coercion is directed not at 
getting the person to say that p, but at getting them to say whichever of p or not-p they 
believe?  (Again, I will take it that the coercion prevents the utterance from being a genuine 
assertion.)  There is a sense in which the speaker has more options available to her in such 
situations.  When a speaker is coerced to say that p, then under most circumstances it is 
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obvious to the coercer whether or not the speaker does what the coercer requires.  So the 
speaker has only two main choices: to accede and say that p, or to defy the coercion openly.  
When a speaker is coerced to say whichever of p or not-p they believe, it may not be obvious 
to the coercer whether or not the coercion has succeeded.   The speaker can choose defiant 
silence, she can accede and say whichever of p or not-p she believes, or she can say 
whichever of p or not-p she does not believe, but try to appear sincere nevertheless.  
Depending on the chances of being found out, however, the potential cost of this third option 
may be even greater than the costs incurred by remaining silent. 
 
What about coercion to say that p, or to reveal whether p, to an audience which is not aware 
of the coercion?  I have already suggested that coercion undermines its target’s ability to 
undertake obligations even to innocent third parties, so I maintain that a coerced speaker is 
not making an assertion even under such circumstances.  But the moral innocence and 
epistemic ignorance of a third-party audience will weigh in the balance in considering 
whether such utterances are justified; as ever, of course, this will depend upon the details of 
the case in question.  (Michaelson (2016) discusses whether a coerced speaker who tries to 
get an innocent audience to accept that p can count as intentionally deceiving the audience.) 
 
In military or security contexts, a ‘duress code’ or ‘duress signal’ is sometimes established, so 
that, for example, hostages are able to signal to a friendly audience that they are speaking 
under duress, without alerting or provoking their captors.  The signal can involve a fixed 
verbal phrase, or a nonverbal code such as crossed fingers.  (The captured crewmen of the 
USS Pueblo in North Korea improvised various such signals: Bucher and Rascovich (1970).)  
One important feature of these signals is that they lower the justificatory threshold for 
speaking falsely under coercion, by lowering the chance that a morally innocent third-party 
audience will be deceived. 
 
Section 7.  Conclusions 
I have argued that once we recognise that assertion or telling involves normative powers, and 
that non-overwhelming coercion can impair our normative authority, then we should 
recognise that coercion can prevent an utterance from being an assertion, and a fortiori from 
being a lie, even though it has the various surface features which normally indicate assertion.  
In the absence of a sharp distinction between noncoercive and coercive pressure, this doesn’t 
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provide us with a sharp distinction between lies and ‘lies’, but there will be plenty of cases 
which are uncontroversially coercive. 
 
As with invalid ‘promises’ and coerced ‘gifts’, however, coercion does not automatically 
settle whether the coerced person is justified in behaving in a certain way: we can still assess 
intentionally false speech along a moral dimension, even once we recognise that it does not 
constitute lying.  We still have some responsibility for the ways in which we behave under 
non-overwhelming coercion.  A full exploration of the many ways in which speech can be 
coerced, and the many factors relevant to the justification of coerced speech, would amount 
to a lengthy field-guide, which I have not attempted here.  
  
Section 8.  Afterword - Tricked into Lying? 
Duress is often discussed alongside deception, especially in legal contexts.  Just as consents 
and contracts extracted under duress are regarded as invalid, consents and contracts obtained 
through deception likewise do not have the significance they would otherwise have.  As with 
duress, deception can take many forms, and many degrees of severity; mild deception or 
failure to disclose does not always invalidate a consent or contract.  Nevertheless, deception 
can sometimes have the power to invalidate.  What, then, should we say about seeming-
assertions which are obtained via deception: is it possible to trick someone into making an 
assertion, indeed trick someone into telling a lie? 
 
When we think about these issues with regard to gifting, promising, or indeed consenting, a 
typical scenario is as follows.  Someone is deceived into transferring some goods, or saying ‘I 
promise’, or ‘I consent’.  It then becomes apparent to this person that she has been deceived, 
and the question arises whether she is permitted to recover the cash, break the ‘promise’, or 
withdraw her ‘consent’.  (Correlatively, is the deceiver now entitled to behave as if she has 
property rights, or the permissions normally associated with having received a promise or a 
consent?)  That is, we typically imagine a time-lag between the moment at which the person 
is deceived into taking the initial action, and the moment at which, now enlightened, she must 
decide whether to assign normative significance to her earlier action. 
 
Deceptively obtained assertions do not typically involve a time lag in this way.  For the most 
part, the obligations one undertakes by asserting are discharged (or not) in the very moment 
of speaking.  An obligation to speak sincerely with regard to whether p is met or violated 
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immediately it is incurred by asserting as to whether p.  Likewise for the putative obligation 
to speak knowledgeably.  If Brandom and others are right in thinking that assertion involves 
commitments which bind us at later times – commitments to defend or retract, for example – 
then this does introduce the possibility of time lag.  But such views do not entail that 
assertion does not also make normative demands upon the speaker at the moment of speech. 
 
Someone who is deceived into making an assertion-like utterance believes as she speaks that 
she is genuinely asserting, even if in fact the deception makes it the case that she does not 
genuinely assert.  Suppose that someone in these circumstances speaks falsely, with the 
intention to deceive.  Then, insofar as we are judging the speaker, rather than her action, the 
speaker seems as culpable for this speech as she would have been were she genuinely lying, 
as indeed she takes herself to be.  That said, so long as we do not take an exceptionlessly 
strict line against lying, the nature of the deception will be relevant to our evaluation here: 
someone who is deceived into ‘lying’ for what she thinks is the greater good is more 
admirable than someone who is deceived into ‘lying’ for what she thinks will be her personal 
gain. 
 
Just as we saw with coercion, this very brief discussion of deceptively-obtained ‘lies’ 
indicates the importance of attention to the varying details of different cases.  Nevertheless, 
as with coercion, this again illustrates the usefulness of distinguishing between the power of 
deception to undermine the usual normative structure of assertion, and the more limited 
power of deception to excuse or justify certain types of speech. 
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